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Does risk taking change as a function of age? We conducted a systematic literature search and found 29 comparisons
between younger and older adults on behavioral tasks thought tomeasure risk taking (N = 4,093). The reports relied
on various tasks differing in several respects, such as the amount of learning required or the choice framing (gains
vs. losses). The results suggest that age-related differences vary considerably as a function of task characteristics,
in particular the learning requirements of the task. In decisions from experience, age-related differences in risk
taking were a function of decreased learning performance: older adults were more risk seeking compared to younger
adults when learning led to risk-avoidant behavior, but were more risk averse when learning led to risk-seeking
behavior. In decisions from description, younger adults and older adults showed similar risk-taking behavior for the
majority of the tasks, and there were no clear age-related differences as a function of gain/loss framing. We discuss
limitations and strengths of past research and provide suggestions for future work on age-related differences in risk
taking.
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The 21st century is likely to become the century of
centenarians: most babies born since 2000 in coun-
tries with already long life expectancies, such asGer-
many and France, may live to be 100 years old.1 Ris-
ing life expectancy will likely lead to longer working
lives and the need for people to make decisions that
are fraught with uncertainty late in life. Risk and
uncertainty pervades decisions about wealth and
health across the life span, such as the decision to
invest in stocks, bonds, or other investment vehicles,
given the possibility of ever-faster cycles of booms
and busts, or the decision about which of several
medical treatment options to pursue (e.g., surgery,
radiation, and chemotherapy), given their different
chances of success and risks of severe side effects.2
In addition, aging is associated with significant mo-
tivational and cognitive changes that are likely to
affect decisions in predictable ways, and thus re-
search in this domain provides an important test
bed concerning the role of these factors on decision
making. Is there evidence that decision making un-
der risk changes systematically with advancing age?
Reviews on aging and decision making abound,
yet there has been no systematic attempt to quantify
age-related differences in risky choice across tasks
and studies.3–5 We aim to close this gap by applying
meta-analyticmethods to quantify adult age-related
differences in risky choice. The review is organized
as follows. First, we provide a brief overview of the
theory and measurement of risky choice. Second,
we present hypotheses about the link between aging
and risky choice. Third, we report a meta-analytic
summary of empirical studies on risky choice in
younger and older adults. Finally, we discuss limi-
tations of past studies and make recommendations
for future work on the impact of aging on decisions
under risk.
The economic and psychological
definitions of risk
In economics, risk is usually defined as the vari-
ance or probability of possible outcomes.6 As Frank
Knight, a founder of the Chicago School of Eco-
nomics, has pointed out, one should distinguish
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between different types of “probability situations,”
namely, a priori probabilities, statistical proba-
bilities, and estimates.7 According to Knight, a
priori probabilities refer to situations in which the
probability of an outcome is known or can eas-
ily be assigned via mathematical calculation. In
turn, statistical probabilities refer to situations in
which the probabilities must be gauged empirically
through experience with similar outcomes. Finally,
estimates refer to situations of extreme uncertainty
in which there is no basis to empirically derive
probabilities, for example, because one is dealing
with unique events. In such cases, it is not clear
how to assess the likelihood of an outcome. In
the remainder of this paper, we will be concerned
with the distinction between a priori and statistical
probabilities.
Recent work on the psychology of risky choice
seems to echo the distinction between a priori and
statistical probabilities by emphasizing the differ-
ent psychological requirements of decisions from
description and experience: many studies in deci-
sion research have assessed risky behavior on the
basis of people’s choices between gambles or lot-
teries in which full information about probabilities
and outcomes is provided—decisions from descrip-
tion. In contrast, decisions from experience pro-
vide no explicit information about probabilities,
and individuals must rely on experience acquired
through feedback. The evidence is mounting for
the need to distinguish between these two types
of decisions because of systematic differences be-
tween the two paradigms: when individuals make
decisions from experience, rare events tend to have
less impact than they deserve according to their ob-
jective probabilities; in turn, in decisions from de-
scription, people behave as if the rare events have
more impact than they deserve.8–11 A number of
factors may contribute to these differences, includ-
ing the reliance on modest samples of experience,
memory effects (e.g., recency), and sampling strate-
gies used to acquire information in decisions from
experience.11
The distinction between experience and descrip-
tion is mirrored in the panoply of tasks that have
been used tomeasure risky behavior (see Table 1 for
task descriptions).12,13 A number of tasks provide
explicit information about outcome magnitudes,
whether outcomes are positive (gains) or negative
(losses), as well as their respective probabilities, but
differ nevertheless in many other respects. For ex-
ample, some tasks, like the Cambridge Gambling
Task (CGT), present people with unavoidable risk
by forcing them to choose between two or more
monetary gambles that differ in their variance.14
Other tasks demand a decision between a sure out-
come and a risky gamble with a certain probability
of gain or loss, thus allowing people to avoid risk
altogether by choosing the safe outcome.15 In these
tasks, risk aversion is reflected in preferring the less
risky (e.g., variable) of the two risky prospects or
the safe prospect over the risky one. To facilitate as-
sessment of risk, probabilities are sometimes repre-
sented as frequencies in the formof cups or bowls, or
the problems are presented in well-known formats,
such as card games.16,17 Finally, learning paradigms
rely on participants’ ability to learn the probabili-
ties of outcomes from experience, and they differ in
whether the riskier option is the more or less ad-
vantageous one. For example, some tasks, like the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT),18 require participants
to learn to avoid the initially attractive risky options
with negative expected value in favor of the initially
less-attractive risky options with positive expected
value, whereas others, such as the balloon analogue
risk task (BART),19 favor learning to make riskier
but potentially more lucrative choices.
Risky choice and aging
Economists, biologists, and anthropologists have
theorized about how life cycle variables, such as re-
productivepotential andage, affect risky choice.20–22
Overall, these theories propose that risk taking is
a function of reproductive competition, which is
usually more intense for younger men than women
or older adults, thus suggesting that aging should
be associated with reduced risk taking. Epidemio-
logical data concerning sexual behavior and crime
statistics suggest that risk taking peaks in young
adulthood and declines with advancing age.20 In
this paper, we assess the empirical evidence from
behavioral studies to quantify age-related differ-
ences in risk-taking behavior. In addition, we help
assess how specific cognitive processes or task re-
quirements contribute to such differences. In other
words, we aim to clarify some of the proximalmech-
anisms underlying age-related differences in risky
choice.
Aging is associated with structural and neuro-
modulatory changes thought to underlie age-related
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Table 1.Behavioral measures of risk included in the meta-analysis





Subjects choose one card per trial from four decks. Two of the decks are
“advantageous” (positive expected value) and two decks are
“disadvantageous” (negative expected value). Subjects learn about the
decks’ characteristics from the gains and losses associated with each
card. Risk taking is measured as the average number of selections from








Subjects allocate their money between two stocks and one bond. The
bond’s payoff stays constant over all trials. In each block of trials, there
is a “good” stock leading to better outcomes than the “bad” stock and
subjects can learn about the stocks’ characteristics over trials from the
gains and losses associated with each investment. Risk seeking is
measured as the number of stock choices that deviate from those of a






Subjects pump a balloon for as many pumps as they want without
knowing when it will explode. Each pump increases the amount of
money won but also the chance of explosion. The subject can stop
pumping to save the money earned before the balloon explodes, but if
the balloon explodes the accumulated money for that balloon is lost.
Subjects learn about the probability of a balloon exploding over trials.







Subjects have to decide between a sure amount and a risky gamble
involving points or money, with decisions being made in the gain or
loss domain. Tasks differ regarding whether probabilities are presented
numerically or as bowls or cups. Risk taking is measured as the number
of choices of the sure amount.
12
Blackjack Subjects are given a two-card hand and decide whether they want to take
a third card. Each card is worth a number of points and the aim is to
collect as many points as possible without exceeding a total sum of 21
points. Risk taking is measured as the proportion of trials in which





Subjects bet concerning the location of a token. A token is hidden behind
one of six red or blue boxes varying in their ratio (5:1, 4:2, 3:3). On
each trial, subjects bet where the token is and every choice is associated
with a potential gain or loss. The higher probability color is associated
with lower gains (losses) than lower probability color. Risk taking is
measured as the proportion of trials in which participants choose the
lower probability color.
2
Note: N, number of studies that used the respective task included in the meta-analysis.
decline in some aspects of attention,memory, learn-
ing, and cognitive control.23,24 Age-related decline
in some basic cognitive abilities may lead to changes
in risky choice in different ways. First, decline in
some aspects of cognitive control, such as working
memory, may affect strategy selection and appli-
cation. Older adults seem to rely on simpler deci-
sion strategies that require less information search
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and/or integration of information.25–27 Addition-
ally, older adultsmakemore errors when integrating
information relative to younger adults, at least when
many pieces of informationmust be combined.27–29
In addition, deficits in reward learning can lead to
difficulties in learning associations between objects
and their payoffs and ultimately adapting decision
behavior to specific task structures.27,30−32 In con-
trast, age differences in both behavior and neu-
ral activity largely disappear when comparing de-
cision tasks without a strong learning component.33
Learning deficits seem particularly likely to affect
decisions from experience in which decision mak-
ers must learn about options from feedback over
time, and can thus contribute to different patterns
of age-related differences in decisions from experi-
ence versus description (see also a related review by
Eppinger, Ha¨mmerer, and Li in this volume71).
Aging is also associated withmotivational and af-
fective changes,34,35 and both emotional and mo-
tivational states have been shown to affect risky
choice.36,37 Motivational theories suggest that aging
maybeassociatedwith increased focusonemotional
regulation, which can lead to biases in information
processing.38 For example, younger and older adults
have been shown to differ in the anticipation of
losses (but not gains) in simple decision tasks, with
older adults showing less responsiveness to losses
relative to younger adults.39 However, there is also
some evidence that older adults are more likely to
work toward preventing losses relative to younger
adults, who tend to strive for gains.40 Age-related
differences in anticipation or desired prevention of
losses are thus also a potential mechanism leading
to developmental differences in risky choice.
A meta-analysis of adult age differences in
risky choice
The goal of the present work was to summarize ex-
tant research findings on age-related differences in
risky choice as well as to test the hypothesis that the
differences vary as a function of the nature of the
task. Specifically, we aimed to test the expectation
that age-related differences in risky choice are to a
large extent a function of the learning requirements
of a task. The underlying rationale is that, relative
to decisions from description, decisions from expe-
rience are more likely to tax learning and memory
components that are significantly affected by age-
related cognitive decline. In addition, we tested the
hypothesis that the domain (gains vs. losses) con-
tributes to age-related differences in risky choice.
Our analysis followed two main steps. First, we
conducted a systematic literature search for origi-
nal empirical reports that compared risky choice of
younger and older adults. We focused particularly
on studies using a behavioral measure of risk and
obtained 29 age comparisons, themajority of which
focused on decisions concerningmonetary rewards.
Second, we used meta-analytic methods to sum-
marize the differences between age groups. They
provide an objective, quantitative, and transparent
way to synthesize research and, therefore, help to go




We used the following methods to locate articles
dealing with the topic of age-related differences in
risky choice:
(1) a computerized literature search using
PsycINFO, EBSCO, and Google with a com-
bination of keywords relating to risk, includ-
ing the names of specific behavioral measures
of risk mentioned in literature reviews3–5,12,13
(e.g., the game of dice task, the CGT, cups
task, the probability-associated gambling task,
blackjack, BART, the Devil’s task, the risky
gains task, IGT, the behavioral investment al-
location strategy, risk, risk taking, risky choice,
or gamble), and keywords related to age-
related differences and aging (aging, older
adults, elderly, or age differences); the litera-
ture search was limited to articles published in
the period from 1900 to January 31, 2011;
(2) a computerized search in PsycINFO and
EBSCO for articles citing the original paper
that reported any of the risk measures men-
tioned above;
(3) a search for papers cited in reviews on aging
and decision making;3–5 and
(4) a check of the references of the articles found
through the searches above.
Inclusion criteria
We limited our analysis to those studies that met the
following criteria (see Supporting Information for
additional details and a list of excluded papers):
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(1) studies that reported data concerning at least
one age group comparison between a group
of younger (ca. 18–35 years) and older (ca.
65–85 years) adults, or this comparison was
obtainable from the authors;
(2) studies that reported results on a behavioral
measure of risk, as opposed to self-report ques-
tionnaires or individuals’ reports of personal-
ity traits related to risk taking;12 the rationale
was that behavioralmeasureswould allowus to
assess age-related differences in risky behavior
rather than people’s descriptive or normative
beliefs about age-related differences concern-
ing risky behavior; and
(3) studies that reported a measure of risky choice
for each age group (mean, standard deviation)
in numerical or graphical format, a test statis-
tic that could be used to compute an effect
size corresponding to age-related differences
in risky behavior, or alternatively, this infor-
mation was obtainable from the authors.
Tables 1 and 2 give an overview of the tasks
and articles that investigate age-related differences
in risky choice that are included in this meta-
analysis.15–17,32,42–64
Data analysis
We first calculated Cohen’s d for each study sep-
arately by computing the difference between the
younger group mean minus the older group mean
on the risk measure for each task and dividing this
difference by the pooled standard deviation (see
Supporting Information for details concerning the
definition of risk used for each task and respective
calculations). Ifmeans and standarddeviationswere
not provided, we calculated d from available statis-
tics. Although in some tasks higher scores represent
risk-seeking behavior (e.g., BART), in other tasks
higher scores represent risk-averse behavior (e.g.,
IGT). In order to standardize the meaning of the
effects, we reversed the sign of effects for the former
such that a positive effect size indicated more risk
seeking of older adults relative to younger adults
and a negative value indicated the opposite regular-
ity. We then converted Cohen’s d into Hedge’s g to
prevent biased estimation of effect sizes from studies
with small sample sizes.41 A few studies contributed
with more than one effect size because the same
individuals performed different tasks, and in such
cases we calculated effect sizes separately for each
task. Similarly, some studies presented participants
with separate gain and loss problems. In such cases,
we calculated an overall effect size across the two
domains, as well as separate effects sizes for gains
and losses.
Results
We were interested in assessing whether age-related
differences in decisions from experience are simi-
lar to those found for decisions from description.
Figures 1 and 2 present forest plots with the effect
sizes (Hedge’s g) and respective 95% confidence in-
tervals (CI) for each study that investigated age-
related differences in decisions from experience and
description, respectively. A significance level of 0.05
can be inferred when zero is not contained within
the 95% CI. The figures also show summary effect
sizes for each task under a fixed-effects model. We
also obtained summary effects based on random-
effects models, but the pattern of results is very sim-
ilar to those fromfixed-effects analyses, so we report
the simpler version here.
The meta-analysis suggests that there are signif-
icant age-related differences in risky choice in de-
cisions from experience, but that the pattern of
age differences varies as a function of the task (see
Fig. 1). Older adults were more risk seeking rela-
tive to younger adults in both the IGT (0.28; 95%
CI: 0.25, 0.31) and the BIAS (0.46; 95% CI: 0.39,
0.53), but older adults were more risk averse rel-
ative to younger adults in the BART (−0.38; 95%
CI: −0.44, −0.31). When aggregating across tasks
(but excluding a study in which the same partici-
pants completed multiple tasks),63 one could con-
clude that older adults are more risk seeking relative
to younger adults (0.28; 95% CI: 0.25, 0.31).
Concerning decisions from description (see
Fig. 2), younger adults were slightly more risk seek-
ing relative to older adults in two paradigms. The ef-
fectswere negative but quite small for the Sure/Risky
gamble tasks (−0.03; 95% CI: −0.05, −0.001) and
Blackjack (−0.07; 95% CI: −0.11, −0.03); in turn,
the effect for the CGT was somewhat larger but
suggests that older adults were more risk seeking
relative to younger adults (0.47; 95%CI: 0.40, 0.54).
Overall, aggregating across studies in decisions from
description suggests no systematic age-related dif-
ferences (−0.001; 95% CI: −0.02, 0.02).
We also calculated an overall summary effect size
that included all studies involving decisions from
22 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1235 (2011) 18–29 c© 2011 New York Academy of Sciences.
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Table 2. Studies included in the meta-analysis
N




Study Task(s) Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger
Ashman, Dror, Houlette & Levy42 Blackjack 16 16 75.0 (6.8) 25.0 (4.4) – –
Baena, Allen, Kaut & Hall43 IGT 39 39 60–90 18–35 – –
Bruine de Bruin, Parker &
Fischhoff29
Sure/risky 56 63 76.7 (5.8) 24.9 (5.6) – –
Deakin, Aitken, Robbins &
Sahakian44
CGT 45 41 53–79 17–27 – –
Denburg, Tranel & Bechara45 IGT 40 40 56–85 26–55 – –
Denburg et al.46 IGT 79 73 48.6 (11.9) 74.0 (5.6) 15.8 (2.6) 15.8 (2.0)
Dror, Katona & Mungur16 Blackjack 18 18 59–91 18–22 – –
Fein, McGillivray & Finn47 IGT 52 112 73.3 (7.4) 37.8 (10.7) 16.1 (2.1) 16.4 (1.8)
Henninger, Madden & Huettel48 IGT, CGT, BART 54 58 70.7 (4.4) 23.4 (3.0) 15.9 (2.7) 15.0 (1.9)
Holliday49 Sure/risky 24 24 69.4 (3.8) 24.2 (2.3) 12.6 (2.3) 14.9 (2.3)
Isella, Mapelli, Morielli, Franceschi
& Ildebrando50
IGT 40 40 65.4 (8.6) 27.9 (4.7) 8.7 (3.6) 13.1 (2.1)
Kim, Goldstein, Hasher & Zacks51 Sure/risky 186 186 58–78 17–28 – –
Lamar & Resnick52 IGT 20 23 69.1 (5.0) 28.4 (5.9) 15.5 (3.4) 15.7 (2.6)
Lauriola & Levin53 Sure/risky 23 26 61–80 21–40 – –
Lee, Leung, Fox, Gao & Chan54 Sure/risky 9 12 65.2 (4.2) 29.2 (6.2) 16.2 (1.2) 17.2 (1.8)
MacPherson, Phillips & Della Sala55 IGT 30 30 69.9 (5.5) 28.8 (6.0) 12.4 (3.2) 14.0 (3.2)
Mayhorn, Fisk & Whittle56 Sure/risky 58 58 70.3 (4.8) 20.3 (3.2) – –
Mikels & Reed15 Sure/risky 22 22 71.6 (4.5) 19.8 (1.2) 15.8 (3.5) 14.6 (1.2)
Rafaely, Dror & Remington
(Experiment 1)57
Blackjack 45 42 70.5 (5.5) 20.9 (3.2) 13.3 (2.5) 14.6 (1.4)
Rafaely, Dror & Remington
(Experiment 2)57
Blackjack 53 50 71.0 (5.2) 21.0 (4.4) – –
Rolison, Hanoch &Wood58 BART 44 40 76.6 (5.9) 19.3 (1.8) 16.5 (–) 13.4 (–)
Ro¨nnlund, Karlsson, Laggna¨s &
Lindstro¨m59
Sure/risky 192 192 69.1 (7.4) 23.9 (3.5) 9.9 (3.9) 14.4 (2.2)
Samanez-Larkin, Kuhnen, Yoo &
Knutson32
BIAS 42 35 72.5 (5.0) 25.7 (4.4) 16.1 (2.6) 16.2 (2.1)
Samanez-Larkin, Wagner &
Knutson60
BIAS 59 49 70.6 (4.3) 27.3 (4.6) – –
Sproten, Diener, Fiebach &
Schwieren61
Sure/risky 24 51 68.0 (7.3) 25.0 (3.5) 12.2 (1.4) 12.6 (1.3)
Watabene & Shibutani62 Sure/risky 168 661 72.5 (4.1) 44.8 (11.5) – –
Weller, Levin & Denburg17 Sure/risky 61 358 65–85 18–22 – –
Wood, Busemeyer, Koling, Cox &
Davis63
IGT 63 87 77.0 (5.2) 23.0 (5.9) 14.7 (2.3) 14.2 (1.2)
Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz &
Delazer64
IGT, Sure/risky 52 33 69.3 (7.0) 36.1 (13.7) 10.4 (2.5) 10.7 (1.3)
Total N 1614 2479
Average agea 69 28
Average education 13 15
Note: IGT, IowaGamblingTask;CGT,CambridgeGamblingTask;BART,balloonanalogue risk task;BIAS, behavioral investment
allocation strategy.
aWe used the midpoint for studies reporting age ranges only.
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Figure 1. Decisions from experience. Forest plot for stud-
ies using decisions from experience paradigms. The positions
of the squares on the x-axis indicate the effect size for each
study; the bars indicate the 95% CI of the effect sizes, and the
sizes of the squares are inversely proportional to the respective
standard errors (i.e., larger squares indicate smaller standard
errors).
description and experience (excluding studies in
which the same participants completed multiple
tasks48,63) and as expected from the heterogeneous
pattern of results, we found a negligible effect of age
(0.07; 95% CI: 0.05, 0.09). Overall, these findings
suggest that pooling across description and experi-
ence categories as well as tasks can obscure signif-
icant effects of age on risky choice. We discuss the
heterogeneity of results as a function of task charac-
teristics in the discussion.
We also aimed to assess whether the domain
(gains vs. losses) had an impact on age-related dif-
ferences in risky choice. Figure 3 presents the effect
sizes (Hedge’s g) and respective 95% CI for studies
for which it was possible to compute effects sepa-
rately for gain and loss domains. All studies involve a
choice between a sure option and a risky gamble. As
can be seen in Figure 3, the results show no effect of
age regarding risky choice in either the gain domain
(−0.05; 95% CI: −0.08, −0.03) or the loss domain
(−0.05; 95% CI: −0.08, −0.02). In sum, existing
studies suggest that younger and older adults show
similar risk behavior in decisions from description
regardless of gain/loss domain (a related discussion
of the impact of gain versus loss frames appears in
the review by Strough, Karns, and Schlosnagle in
this volume).
Discussion
We conducted a systematic literature review and ap-
pliedmeta-analyticmethods to quantify age-related
differences in risky choice.We considered both tasks
involving decisions from experience and decisions
from description. In tasks involving decisions from
experience, information about risk is not explic-
itly provided and participants must learn about the
likelihood of outcomes across a number of trials. In
decisions from description, the risk associated with
each option is explicitly presented to participants.
The results show that the pattern of age-related dif-
ferences varies considerably as a function of the task
used. In two tasks involving decisions from experi-
ence, the IGT and the BIAS, older adults were more
risk seeking relative to younger adults. However,
in another learning task, the BART, older adults
proved to be more risk averse relative to younger
adults. How can we reconcile these apparently con-
tradictory findings within the decisions from expe-
rience category? In our view, the key to this riddle is
that the IGT, BART, and BIAS differ systematically
in their payoff structure. In the IGT, the subop-
timal course of action is tantamount to choosing
the negative expected value options: learning thus
means to avoid taking cards from an initially attrac-
tive but ultimately disadvantageous deck of cards in
favor of the more advantageous decks, particularly
a low-risk (variance) deck.63 This requires reversal
learning, which may be impaired with aging.65 In
contrast, in the BART, participants’ initial impulse
is to pump substantially less than would be optimal
(and thereby avoid the loss of the accumulated in-
come): learning in the BART thus usually leads to
taking more risk (i.e., more pumping on each bal-
loon) and a more profitable payoff.19 Clearly, there
are likely to be various processes or traits impli-
cated in age differences in BART, including a focus
on immediate reward (points accrued), insensitiv-
ity to loss (balloons exploded), or a combination
of the two. But regardless of which processes cause
cautious pumping, learning deficits will play out
differently in the BART and the IGT task, respec-
tively. In the IGT, impaired learning purportedly
results in fewer choices of the less risky but pos-
itive expected value deck and, thus, overall more
risk-seeking behavior. In the BART, impaired learn-
ing results in fewer pumps and thus overall more
risk-averse behavior. Even more complex dynamics
24 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1235 (2011) 18–29 c© 2011 New York Academy of Sciences.
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Figure 2. Decisions from description. Forest plot for studies
using decisions from description paradigms. The positions of
the squares on the x-axis indicate the effect size for each study;
the bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the effect sizes,
and the sizes of the squares are inversely proportional to the
respective standard errors (i.e., larger squares indicate smaller
standard errors).
are required to maximize earnings in the BIAS task.
Participants learn to initially prefer the certain op-
tion and then shift toward the best of the two risky
options.32 In the BIAS, a learning deficit may lead
to more risk-seeking throughout the task. Conse-
quently, the seemingly conflicting pattern of age-
related differences within decisions from experience
is consistent with an age-related decline in learning
abilities.
The results from the decisions from description
suggest that younger and older adults show similar
risk-taking behavior when learning components are
excluded from task demands, at least for two out of
the three tasks we considered, namely those tasks in-
volving a choicebetweenagamble anda safe amount
or a task modeled on the Blackjack card game. Our
analysis revealed significant age differences in the
CGT. One explanation for this pattern of results is
the strict trade-off involved between probability and
outcome in the CGT task. A risky choice in the CGT
corresponds to choosing a low probability outcome
that leads to a high reward, while the safe (high
probability) choice leads to a lower reward. This
trade-off may be particularly challenging for older
adults if they use simple strategies that focus on the
highest payoff (e.g., maximax) and ignore or un-
derweight probability magnitudes.66 The safe/risky
and blackjack paradigms do not involve such a strict
trade-off and therefore a focus on rewardmagnitude
may not lead to strong age differences.
In sum, our findings do not match expecta-
tions from life-history theories,16,44,61 which pre-
dict general differences in risk-taking behavior with
increased age. Instead, our results emphasize the
importance of understanding how different task
characteristics engender age-related differences in
risky choice.Our results thuspresent a startingpoint
for future work examining the conditions that foster
competent decision making by the elderly.
Limitations and recommendations
for future work
Our work has a number of limitations due to the
current state of the field. First, we based our analy-
ses on a relatively small number of papers and tasks,
which may provide an incomplete or, even worse, a
biased viewof age-relateddifferences in risky choice.
Second, life-history theories suggest that the pattern
of age-related differences in risky behavior change
considerably from young adulthood to middle age
and less so afterwards.20 Unfortunately, few stud-
ies have tested participants across the full adult age
range, which prevented us from studying the link
between age and risky behavior across the complete
adult development continuum. However, the de-
sign that most studies have adopted, namely, con-
trasting a sample of young adults with a sample of
older adults, should boost the chances of finding
differences in risky behavior with age (to the extent
they exist), because according to life-history theo-
ries, risk taking should differ most between younger
and older adults. Third, the studies analyzed can-
not assess the role of cohort effects in risk-taking
behavior, yet historical trends could prove a pow-
erful determinant of financial behavior.67 Finally, a
further limitation concerns our inability to gauge
age-related differences as a function of theoretically
meaningful but unavailable manipulations, such as
reward or probability magnitudes. For example, the
well-known fourfold pattern of risky choice suggests
that both domain (gain vs. loss) and probability
magnitudes determine choice.68 However, the stud-
ies we analyzed did not systematically distinguish
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Figure 3. Decisions from description: gains vs. losses. Forest
plot for studies using decisions from description and that dis-
tinguish between gain and loss domains. The positions of the
squares on the x-axis indicate the effect size for each study; the
bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the effect sizes,
and the sizes of the squares are inversely proportional to the
respective standard errors (i.e., larger squares indicate smaller
standard errors).
between low- and high-probability outcomes, thus
ruling out an analysis that considers both domain
(gain/loss) and probability magnitude.
Another limitation of the literature to date, and
by extension of our review, is that it has rarely quan-
tified age-related differences in decisionmaking that
may be related to the accumulation of life experi-
ence. It is important to keep in mind that the deci-
sions from experience tasks described here require
relatively rapid learning from a limited amount of
feedback in a novel environment. This experience-
based learning should be distinguished from the
learning that occurs over the lifetime and accumu-
lates. It is possible that this form of decisionmaking
based on learning from limited experience indexes
amore fluid component of cognition, whereas deci-
sions that are made based on accumulated life expe-
rience may index a more crystallized component of
cognition.69 We hope that future studies will more
systematically examine how both of these experi-
ence measures may differentially contribute to risky
decision making.
Still another limitation of this review is its al-
most exclusive focus on more traditional incentive-
based tasks (whereparticipants attempt tomaximize
points or monetary earnings). Age-related differ-
ences in the motivational value of money may have
contributed to poorer learning from feedback. Con-
sequently, it would be important to assess whether
a similar pattern of results would emerge in other
domains for which the objective is not the maxi-
mization of money but of some other dimensions
equally treasured by young and old people (e.g., so-
cial relationships, sexual behavior, recreational ac-
tivities). Unfortunately, there are currently far fewer
studies that focus on these types of risky choice,
and what does exist does not fit well within the tax-
onomy of tasks that we adopted from the Decision
Making Individual Differences Inventory.12 As this
area of literature continues to expand, we will be in-
creasingly able to examine the domain specificity or
generality of age-related differences in risky choice.
Our review also identified some general limita-
tionsofprevious researchon the topicof risky choice
and aging. First, we found that many of the studies
were underpowered. Specifically, we calculated the
power of each study given its sample size and an
effect of the magnitude indicated by our aggrega-
tion of studies separately for each task ( = 0.05),
and found that more than 90% of studies were un-
derpowered (power< 0.8). Meta-analyses can over-
come power limitations by pooling across studies,
but such a state of affairs is undesirable for indi-
vidual studies because failure to detect significant
resultsmaybedue to lackof power rather thannegli-
gible effects. For example, onepaper reportedno sig-
nificant differences in risk taking between an older
(n= 18) and a younger (n= 18) group, even though
the age effect was of medium size (g = −0.45).16
Second, there is room for methodological improve-
ment, for example, concerning the provision of clear
incentives.70 Only 51% of the studies paid partici-
pants forparticipation, andaneven smaller amount,
28%, paid participants in a performance-contingent
fashion. We conducted exploratory analyses to
assess the impact of performance-contingent pay-
ment on the size of age-related differences but found
no evidence for a moderating role of hypotheti-
cal versus actual payment. Nevertheless, the use of
performance-contingentpayment in future research
26 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1235 (2011) 18–29 c© 2011 New York Academy of Sciences.
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could help ensure that any age-related differences
found are not due to unclear reward structures or
varying effects of hypothetical payoffs.
Finally, this review points to voids in the litera-
ture. Only aminority of the studies identified in our
searchpresentedparticipantswithdifferent decision
tasks and thuswere able to compare performance on
decisions from description and experience.48,63 Un-
fortunately, even these studies did not fully equate
the structure or information provided in the differ-
ent tasks. Consequently, it is hard to interpret the
differences found. Future work with paradigms that
equate decisions from experience and description
would allow researchersmore direct assessment and
comparison of how search, integration, and deci-
sion components can lead to age-related differences
in risky choice. Further, a main conclusion from
our analysis is that task characteristics are pivotal in
determining age-related difference in risky choice,
and it remains to be studied which aspects of de-
cisions from description and experience contribute
to moderating age effects. For example, there may
be different formats of decisions from experience
that can increase or decrease task difficulty for those
with declining capacity to learn.59
Conclusion
Increases in life expectancy pose challenges to mod-
ern societies that can be met partly by assuring that
older adults canmake soundhealth andfinancial de-
cisions. We conducted a systematic literature search
and quantified age-related differences in decisions
under risk. In decisions involving learning from ex-
perience, age-related differences in risk taking were
a function of decreased learning performance: older
adults were more risk seeking compared to younger
adults when learning resulted in risk-averse behav-
ior, but proved more risk averse when learning re-
sulted in risk-seeking behavior. In decisions from
description, the majority of studies suggest negligi-
ble differences between younger and older adults’
risky behavior, but there are exceptions as a func-
tion of the experimental paradigm used. Overall,
our findings suggest both that the pattern of age-
related differences in risk taking is complex but sys-
tematic as a function of task demands and thatmore
work is needed to identify the task properties (in the
laboratory and in the wild) as well as the proximal
mechanisms that give rise to age-related differences
in risky choice.
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